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15. AGRICULTURAL LABOUR AND FARM 
SUBSIDIES: NEW EVIDENCE FROM 
THE EU 
ALESSANDRO OLPER, VALENTINA 
RAIMONDI, DANIELE CAVICCHIOLI 
AND MAURO VIGANI* 
his chapter summarises the main results reported in Olper et al. (2013), who 
investigated the relationship between CAP subsidies and the reallocation of 
agricultural labour. Exploiting the properties of a large data set covering 
150 EU regions during the 1990-2009 period, this study found robust evidence 
that CAP payments contributed significantly to maintaining jobs in agriculture. 
However, the economic magnitude of this effect is quite low, and strongly 
heterogeneous across different CAP payments, i.e. Pillar I subsidies exert an effect 
more than two times greater than Pillar II payments.  
 
1. Introduction 
The creation and maintenance of jobs in agriculture and in rural areas has 
been a traditional CAP target, and an objective recently re-stated and 
emphasised by several EU official documents (e.g. European Commission, 
2010; European Parliament, 2010).32 However, the effectiveness of subsidies 
                                                     
* This chapter is based on Olper, Raimondi, Cavicchioli & Vigani, “Does the 
Common Agricultural Policy Reduce Farm Labour Migration? Panel data analysis 
across EU regions”, Factor Markets Working Paper No. 28, July 2012. 
32 The European Commission reflection on the future of the CAP, “The CAP 
Towards 2020” (EC, COM(2010) 672), explicitly addressed agricultural and rural 
labour issues in several sections of the document. Labour and rural areas 
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in maintaining the labour force in the agricultural sector is unclear and the 
empirical evidence is still largely inconclusive. Over the last 50 years, EU 
countries have experienced dramatic adjustments in their agricultural 
labour markets, showing an impressive off-farm migration. Surprisingly, in 
the most recent decades, we do not find any substantial reduction of the 
migration rate, a stylised fact that is at odds with €50 billion per year of 
income subsidies spent through the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).  
During the 1990–2009 period, the off-farm migration rate across the 
EU-15 regions was about 2.5% per annum.33 This average value masks 
substantial differences both over time and, especially, across countries and 
regions. The off-farm migration rate was equal to 3.02% over the 1990–99 
period, going down to 2.06% in the period 2000–09. However, this lower 
rate is largely attributable to a value close to zero in 2008 and even slightly 
negative in 2009, probably as an effect of the 2008 commodities price spike 
and of the 2009 global crisis. Across EU regions, the net farm migration rate 
shows great variation (Figure 15.1). Consistent with expectations, there is a 
negative relationship between the level of development and the rate of off-
farm migration, as less developed regions are still in structural 
transformation. However, this negative relation is weak.  
A central question analysed in this chapter is the extent to which farm 
subsidies played a role in affecting these patterns of off-farm migration. 
Mainly due to data limitations, existing evidence concerning the effect of 
CAP subsidies on off-farm labour migration has been quite inconclusive. 
This evidence is mostly confined to specific countries or regional case 
studies, only rarely focusing on the European-wide perspective 
(Shucksmith et al., 2005; Petrick & Zier, 2011; 2012). Thus, although 
interesting and often rich in detailed interpretations, such studies only 
measure the CAP effects within a single country or region, an approach 
that has the advantage of keeping factors such as institutions fixed. 
However, these studies are difficult to generalise to other countries and 
regions where there are wide differences in development, labour market 
institutions and farming structures.  
                                                                                                                                       
employment issues are also well represented in the recent European Parliament 
document on CAP reforms, “On the Future of the CAP after 2013” (EP 439.972).  
33 Regional off-farm migration rate, , is estimated as 
 = 	1 +  −  ⁄ , where  is the stock of agricultural labour in the 
region i and year t, and	 = 	 −  ⁄  is the growth rate of the total labour 
force. See Olper et al. (2012) for details.  
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Figure 15.1 Average annual off-farm migration rate, 1990–2009 
 
Source: Authors computation based on data from Olper et al. (2012). 
This chapter summarises the main findings reported in Olper et al. 
(2012) on the effect of CAP subsidies on off-farm migration across the EU 
regions. The chapter starts with a short review of the empirical literature to 
date. In Section 3, after a non-technical discussion of the method, key 
results are presented in term of the estimated off-farm migration elasticity 
to CAP payments. Finally, Section 4 concludes. 
2. The empirical literature to date 
Table 15.1 summarises the empirical literature on the effect of farm 
subsidies on the agricultural labour market. Theoretically, these studies can 
be divided into two main approaches: studies based on household models 
to analyse the impact of subsidies on the allocation of household labour 
(Lee, 1965; Becker, 1965); and those based on models of occupational choice 
to investigate the process of entry and exit from the agricultural sector 
(Todaro, 1969; Harris & Todaro 1970; Mundlak, 1979). The above 
distinction is also reflected in empirical works, with studies at the farm-
household level largely based on micro farm-level data, and studies on the 
inter-sectoral reallocation of agricultural labour conducted at the aggregate 
(country or regional) level.  
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Table 15.1 The labour effect of farm payments: The literature to date  
 
 
Micro-data allow us to address individual adjustment behaviour in 
response to changes in factors affecting household utility, such as different 
revenues sources. For example, Mishra & Goodwin (1997), focusing on 
farm households in Kansas, found that policy changes that reduce farm 
income support can increase off-farm employment of the operators and 
Author Country Data level Empirical 
methods Period Data structure Output variable Type of Subsidy
Subsidy net 
Effect
Additional 
information
Barkley (1990) US Aggregate OLS 1940-1985 Time series Out farm labour 
migration
Direct payments
0
Goetz and Debertin (1996) US Aggregate OLS 1980-1990 Cross-section Population out-
migration
Federal farm program 
payments +
Mishra and Goodwin (1997) Kansas Household Tobit 1992 Cross-section Off-farm labour 
supply
Federal farm program 
payments −
Goetz and Debertin (2001) US Household OLS 1987-1997 Cross-section Net farm exit rate Federal farm program 
payments
−
Goodwin and Holt (2002) Bulgary Household Probit + others 1995 Cross-section Off-farm work 
participation
Social benefit 
payments
−
Pietola et al.  (2003) Finland Household Multinomial 
Probit
1993-1998 Panel Out farm labour 
migration
Per hectar subsidies 0
El-Osta et al. ( 2004) US Household Tobit 2001 Cross-section On-farm labour 
supply
AMTA, loan 
deficiency, disaster 
and market loss 
payments
+  (on-farm)                   
− (off-farm)
Heterogeneity 
effects across 
subsidies
Foltz (2004) Connecticut Household Probit 1996-2001 Panel Farm exit rate Price support 
subsidies −
Goodwin and Mishra (2004) US Household OLS 2001 Cross-section Off-farm labour 
supply
Decoupled  payments
−
Serra et al. (2005) Kansas Aggregate Probit 1994-2000 Cross-section Off-farm labour 
supply
Decoupled payments
0
Glauben et al. (2006) Germany Household OLS 1991-1999 Cross-section Out farm labour 
migration
Sectoral subsidies 
payments 0
Benjamin and Kimhi (2006) France Household Multinomial 
Logit
2000 Cross-section On-farm work 
participation
Direct payments for 
young farmers
−
Ahearn et al.  (2006) US Household Probit 1999 vs. 1996 Cross-section Off-farm work 
participation
Coupled and 
decoupled payments −              
Key et al.  (2006) US Household OLS 1992 and 1997 Cross-section Off-farm labour 
supply
Federal crop insurance 
subsidies and total 
government payments
−
Breustedt and Glauben 
(2007)
110 EU 
regions
Aggregate OLS 1993-1997 Cross-section Out farm labour 
migration
Direct payments and 
price support
−
Dewbre and Mishra (2007) US Household OLS 1998-2001 Cross-section On farm work AMTA, loan 
deficiency, disaster 
and market loss 
‒ (AMTA)         
+ (coupled)
AMTA are 
decoupled, other 
subsidies coupled
Goodwin et al. (2007) US Household Probability-
weighted 
bootstrapping
2003-2004 Cross-section Off-farm labour 
supply
Coupled and 
(decoupled) payments − (decoupled)     
+ (coupled)
Hennessy and Rehman 
(2008)
Ireland Household Probit /OLS 2002 Cross-section Probability (hours) of 
off-farm participation
Decoupled payments
+                   
Gullstrand and Tezic (2008) Sweden Household Logit 1989-2003 Panel Out farm labour 
migration of salaried 
workers
Objective 1 Structural 
Funds Programme 0
Pufahl and Weiss (2009) Germany Household Propensity 
Score Matching
2000-2005 Panel On-farm labour 
supply
Agri-environment 
programs +                                
Van Herck (2009) 144 EU 
Regions
Household Logit 2005-2006 Cross-section Out farm labour 
migration
Coupled and 
decoupled payments +
Uchida et al . (2009) China Household D-in-D 
Matching 
1999-2004 Panel Off-farm labour 
supply
Payment for 
ecosystem service
+
Becker et al. (2010) EU NUTS 2 Aggregate Regression 
Discontinuity 
Design
1989–2006 Cross-section Total Employment 
growth
Objective 1 Structural 
Funds Programme 0
D'Antoni and Mishra (2010) US Aggregate Autoregressive 
distributed lag 
model
1940-2007 Time series Out farm labour 
migration
Direct  payments
−
Petrick and Zier (2011) 3 East-
Germany 
landers
Aggregate LSDV 1999-2006 Panel Out farm labour Coupled, decoupled 
and rural development 
CAP payments
+                         
(0 livestock 
payments)
Heterogeneity 
effects across 
subsidies
Salvioni and Sciulli (2011) Italy Household Propensity 
Score Matching
2003-2007 Panel On-farm family labour Rural development 
Program
+                     
(0 LFA)
Petrick and Zier (2012) 3 East-
Germany 
landers
Aggregate GMM 1999-2006 Panel Out farm labour Coupled, decoupled 
and rural development 
CAP payments
0
Corsi and Salvioni (2012) Italy Household Tobit 2002-2008 Panel Off-farm labour 
participation
Decoupled payments 0
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their spouses. Similarly, El-Osta et al. (2004) showed that US Agricultural 
Market Transition Act (AMTA) payments tend to increase the hours 
operators work on-farm and vice versa. The majority of farm-level studies 
are based on a cross-sectional approach. However, there are also important 
examples of micro-data analysis based on panel data (Pietola et al., 2003; 
Gullstrand & Tezic, 2008). One of the main shortcomings of these studies is 
the short time period normally involved, an issue that makes it difficult to 
isolate all the farmer adjustment processes due to the changes in 
agricultural policy (Glauben et al., 2006).  
The analysis at the aggregate level is, in principle, less data 
constrained, providing results with broader coverage. The process of 
labour migration from one sector to another is assessed by controlling for 
structural variables such as country or regional relative income, 
unemployment, population densities, and institutional and policy 
variables. The econometric approaches of aggregate studies range from 
cross-sectional to time-series analyses and, more recently, to panel data 
methods and also quasi-experimental approaches.  
The seminal work of Barkley (1990) used a two-sector occupation 
choice model on a large time series (from 1940 to 1985) to analyse the 
labour migration out of agriculture in the US, using government payments 
as a key variable. Results show that the effect of farm support on 
agricultural labour is negative but insignificant. D’Antoni & Mishra (2010) 
extended Barkley’s sample to 2007, accounting also for dynamics, through 
an autoregressive distributed lag model. By taking dynamics into account, 
the farm support effect on off-farm labour migration becomes significantly 
negative.  
At the EU level, many studies have investigated the effect of CAP 
payments, as well as of specific national public policies (see Table 15.1). 
From both household and aggregate level studies, the evidence of the direct 
(and indirect) effect of CAP subsidies on off-farm labour 
participation/migration is inconclusive, ranging from negative even to 
positive. Moreover, results are often confined to specific countries or 
regions (Pufahl & Weiss, 2009; Hennessy & Rehman, 2008; Gullstrand & 
Tezic, 2008), mainly as a consequence of data limitation at the EU regional 
level. Several studies used a cross-sectional approach (e.g. Breusted & 
Glauben, 2007; Hennessy & Rehman, 2008; Van Herck, 2009), while those 
which performed a panel data analysis considered only a single country 
and/or specific policy measures (e.g. Gullstrand & Tezic, 2008; Pufahl & 
Weiss, 2009; Salvioni & Sciulli, 2011). 
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Only a few studies have worked at the overall EU level. Breusted & 
Glauben (2007) investigated the effect of total farm subsidies on off-farm 
labour migration in 110 EU NUTS 2 regions, finding that CAP payments 
slowed down structural change in the period 1993–97. Van Herck (2009) 
used a multinomial logit approach to investigate the main destination of 
households exiting the agricultural sector. Coupled, decoupled and total 
subsidies showed a positive effect on off-farm migration for 144 NUTS 2 
EU regions, mainly as a consequence of secondary order effects. Finally, 
within this literature the works of Petrick & Zier (2011; 2012) represent two 
relevant exceptions. They used difference-in-difference and dynamic panel 
models, respectively, and exploited the entire portfolio of CAP payments, 
showing an employment effect on CAP subsidies which goes from weak 
but positive to zero. However, their results focused on just three East 
German regions and are hardly extendible to the EU as a whole. 
To sum up, actual evidence concerning the effect of CAP payments 
on off-farm migration is not only quite inconclusive, but also suffers from 
several drawbacks. First, the evidence often comes from cross-sectional 
inference, and when panel data are used the time coverage is short. Second, 
it is largely focused on country or regional case studies whose findings are 
difficult to generalise to other countries and regions. Third, it rarely takes 
into account the entire portfolio of CAP payments. Last, but not least, no 
particular effort has been taken to account for potential problems of 
endogeneity bias of CAP payments.  
3. New evidence on the CAP subsidies effect on 
agricultural labour 
3.1 Theoretical and empirical background 
From a theoretical point of view, Olper et al. (2013) rely on the theory of 
occupational choice and labour migration decision, which has its roots in 
the Todaro (1969) and Harris & Todaro (1970) two-sector model, 
subsequently developed by Mundlak (1979) and Barkley (1990). In this 
model, there is no room for uncertainty, capital market restrictions and 
adjustment costs (see Breustedt & Glauben, 2007).  
The economy is disaggregated into two sectors: agriculture (i) and 
non-agriculture (j). Individuals choose between working in the agricultural 
or the non-agricultural sector by comparing their expected discounted 
lifetime utility in the two sectors. Assuming that the price of the composite 
consumption good equals one, the utility (V) derived from one occupation 
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is a function of the expected income (Y) and the time spent working (L), 
plus exogenous shifters (Z). An individual selects one occupation over the 
other at time t, such that max  	 ,  , , with r the discount rate, 
and  ⁄ > 0.  
Thus, when the income level in non-farm occupation is higher than 
that in the farm sector, farmers are expected to move away from 
agriculture. However, even though non-farm income may be higher than 
that associated with farming, such a difference may be discounted by the 
probability, "#, of finding a job in the industrial sector. The off-farm 
migration will occur when the expected lifetime utility in the non-farm 
sector – net of the costs $ associated with changing job – exceeds the 
expected lifetime utility in farming. The net migration out from agriculture, 
, is then a function of the arguments of the utility functions in the two 
sectors, and includes the income, the labour force, the probability of finding 
a job, the costs of migration, the age structure, %, and other personal 
characteristics of the farm population, namely  = &', , , "#, $, %(. 
Next, defining the relative income between the non-agricultural and 
agricultural sectors by )* = # ⁄ , clearly the theoretical model predicts that 
 )*⁄ > 0. Thus, other things being equal, to the extent to which farm 
subsidies, +, will contribute to a shrink in relative income, they will 
negatively affect off-farm migration, namely  +⁄ < 0. The empirical 
identification of this direct effect of farm subsidies on off-farm migration, 
together with other effects on the demand for agricultural labour, 
represented one of the main objectives of the Olper et al. (2012) study. 
The predictions above have been tested econometrically in a sample 
of 150 EU-15 regions in the period 1990–2009, using both static and 
dynamic panel estimators, to account for the adjustment nature of the 
migration process and the possible endogeneity of CAP payments. 
Empirically, one of the main challenges is how to measure the policy 
variables at the regional level.34 To overcome these issues, the study 
                                                     
34 Previous studies followed two main approaches: measuring a regionalised 
producer subsidy equivalent (PSE) as in Anders et al. (2004), Tarditi & Zanias 
(2001) and Hansen & Herrmann (2012); using FADN data as in Shucksmith et al. 
(2005), and combining the same source with Eurostat Regio-New Cronos database, 
assuring to the former also a time variation, as in Esposti (2007). However, as 
discussed in Olper et al. (2012) both these approaches have some limitations, 
especially due to the impossibility of investigating the possible differentiated effect 
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adopted a new strategy, measuring CAP payments over the net farm 
income using only Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) data at the 
regional level. The key advantage of this approach is the possibility of 
splitting CAP total payments into their different components: coupled and 
decoupled payments of Pillar I, as well as agri-environmental payments, 
less-favoured areas (LFA), investment aids and a residual category called 
‘other’ subsidies of Pillar II. 
Figure 15.2 Average CAP payments over farm income, 1990–2009 
 
Source: Authors computation based on data from Olper et al. (2012). 
For illustrative purposes, Figure 15.2 reports the 1990–2009 average 
amount of total CAP payments relative to farm income (payments/VA) 
received by the considered EU regions. The pattern that emerges is quite 
close to previous findings (e.g. Shucksmith et al., 2005). In particular, there 
is strong variability in the amount of farm income due to CAP payments. 
The average level in the considered period (33%) masks a large variability 
across regions, which range from close to 0% to above 80%, especially in 
some central and northern Europe regions. However, the correlation 
between the distribution of CAP support and the level of development, 
                                                                                                                                       
between coupled and decoupled payments, as well as the effect of different Pillar II 
subsidies 
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measured as real GDP per capita, is always very low: ‒0.084 for total CAP 
subsidies, ‒0.152 for Pillar I payments, and 0.05 for Pillar II payments.  
3.2 Main findings 
Overall, the econometric results strongly support the model predictions, 
namely that CAP subsidies as a whole have played a role in keeping labour 
forces in agriculture. However, the economic magnitude of the overall 
effect is not particularly high and, interestingly, strongly heterogeneous 
across different CAP payments. A simple comparison between the off-farm 
migration effects of CAP payments is reported in Figures 15.3 and 15.4, 
using the respective (absolute) elasticities, estimated from the econometric 
regressions reported in Olper et al. (2012).35 Several interesting patterns 
emerge. First, a 10% increase in total CAP payments leads to a decrease in 
off-farm migration of about 1.72% when the effect is estimated using the 
static fixed effects model. The value rises to 1.90% and 2.46% when 
dynamics and endogeneity are accounted for. Considering our preferred 
estimate coming from the dynamic model, that controls for the endogeneity 
of CAP payments, meaning that, without subsidies, the EU-15 net off-farm 
migration rate would be equal to 3.2% per year, instead of the current 2.5%.  
                                                     
35 These elasticities are estimated at the sample mean using the following formula: 
./0	1
./0	2
= 3 2̅56
17 56
, where +̅  and 7  are, respectively, the sample mean of the specific 
CAP subsidy and of off-farm migration, while 3 is the estimated marginal effect of 
the CAP subsidy. Note that, to make figure 3 and 4 more readable, we report 
absolute elasticities, although all the estimated elasticities of farm migration to CAP 
payments are negative, but the elasticity to investment aids is positive and always 
significant.  
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Figure 15.3 Off-farm migration elasticity to CAP payments  
 
Notes: The figure reports the (absolute) elasticity of off-farm migration to CAP payments, 
namely the percentage reduction in off-farm migration for an increase of the 
respective CAP subsidies of 1%. This is because the estimated elasticity are always 
negative. The term Static, Dynamic, and Dynamic+endogenous refer to the 
econometric approach used to estimate the underline parameters. See Olper et al. 
2013, for details. 
Source: Authors computation based on data from Olper et al. (2012). 
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Figure 15.4 Off-farm migration elasticity to Pillar II payments  
 
Notes: The figure reports the (absolute) elasticity of off-farm migration to CAP payments, 
namely the percentage reduction in off-farm migration for an increase of the 
respective CAP subsidies of 1%. This is because the estimated elasticity are always 
negative, but the investments aids subsidies. The term Static, Dynamic, and 
Dynamic+endogenous refer to the econometric approach used to estimate the 
underline parameters. See Olper et al. 2013, for details. 
Source: Authors computation based on data from Olper et al. (2012). 
 
This average effect cancels out relevant differences across CAP 
instruments. The long-run elasticity of Pillar I payments, equal to about 
0.274% when dynamics and endogeneity are considered (column 3), is 
indeed about 2.7 times higher in absolute value than the elasticity of Pillar 
II policies. Within Pillar I, the coupled payments display higher absolute 
elasticity than decoupled payments, while across Pillar II instruments, 
investment aids display the highest absolute elasticity to off-farm 
migration, and this elasticity is the only one with a positive effect. Thus, 
considering the value of the above elasticities, one can conclude that, if the 
labour effect of CAP payments is high on the EU policy agenda, then the 
most effective policy tools to reach this objective would be coupled 
payments, followed by decoupled payments, ceteris paribus.  
Another way of interpreting the economic magnitude of these 
findings is through a back-of-the-envelope calculation. Olper et al. (2012), 
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focusing on the off-farm migration effect of total CAP payments, found the 
following numbers. Every year, CAP payments prevented a flow of off-
farm migration of around 27,000 agricultural workers. In percentage terms, 
this means a reduction in farm labour migration ranging from a minimum 
of about 6%, in the more conservative estimate, to a maximum of 20%.36 
Therefore, a conservative view is to interpret these numbers as saying that 
CAP subsidies might generate a reduction in off-farm migration, although 
the effect can be rather moderate. 
4. Concluding remarks 
Understanding the effect of CAP policies is important, as a deeper 
comprehension of their incidence would allow the design of better policies. 
This chapter has summarised the main findings reported in Olper et al. 
(2013), who investigated how different CAP subsidies affected off-farm 
migration across 150 EU regions over the period 1990–2009. Within the 
standard neo-classical two-sectors models, inter-sectoral labour migration 
is affected by across-sector income differences, ceteris paribus. Thus, as far as 
CAP subsidies have been effective in transferring income to farmers, they 
should have contributed to a reduction in the rate of off-farm migration. 
We find strong support for this expectation.  
An interesting implication of the study, which comes from the 
structure of the conceptual model, is related to the ‘efficiency’ of CAP 
payments in transferring income to farmers. Although several previous 
works have documented an overall inefficiency of (coupled) agricultural 
payments (e.g. OECD, 2001), our results seem to partially contradict this 
conclusion. This appears in line with most recent evidence showing that 
farmers gain from 60% to 95% of the value of CAP coupled payments, and 
only a marginal fraction of such payments is capitalised in land rent 
(Michalek et al., 2011).  
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